Re: [wta-talk] Re: FAQ section 2: What is uploading?

Slawek wrote:

>Let me begin by saying that new revised version is excellent.

:-) Thanks.

> Having
>said that I would like to offer some of my input.
>[snip]
>Somewhere above, few sentences should be devoted to Moravec transfer,
>explaining the procedure, but I guess this whole section would have
>to be totally revised.

I've included a short new paragraph about this scenario in the new version
at the end of this message. It also incorporates some of the other
suggestions that were made.

Eugene's point about personal identity issues deserving more discussion is
well taken. Possibly we could add a question on this in the later section
on Transhumanism as a philosophical and cultural viewpoint - identity
issues come up not only in the context of uploading but in general when we
envision radical transformations of ourselves. Let's see if we have stamina
for this when we get there (those with mathematical background may want
comment on the prospect of completing this FAQ if we add a new question for
every one we answer...)

Since it came up, let me say a few words about the general format and
ambition of the FAQ:

The Transhumanist FAQ wants to be a self-contained document which goes
beyond simply answering some common questions by being able also to serve
as a general introduction to transhumanism and as an expression of a kind
of "current best understanding or quasi-consensus among responsible and
knowledgeable transhumanists". Although in the end not everybody will agree
with every single statement in the FAQ, the *effort* to try to develop a
shared core of ideas is important. The FAQ is not a bibliography; links and
reference will normally only added only to works referred to in the text.
It is not a sales brochure either, but aims to represent transhumanism in
objectively, while at the same time seeking to convey as cogently as
possible why we hold our transhumanists values in such high regard. Some
questions - e.g. about whether it's ok to tamper with nature or why we want
to live longer - are actually asking not just for data but for an emotional
rationale, which we need to be able to communicate.

++++++

What is uploading?

Uploading (sometimes called “downloading”, “mind uploading” or “brain
reconstruction”) is the process of transferring an intellect from a
biological brain to a computer.

One way of doing this would be by first scanning the synaptic structure of
a particular brain and then implementing the same computations in an
electronic medium that would normally take place in the neural network of
that brain. A brain scan of sufficient resolution could be produced by
disassembling the brain atom for atom by means of nanotechnology. Other
approaches, such as analyzing pieces of the brain slice by slice in an
electron microscope with automatic image processing have also been
proposed. In addition to mapping the connection pattern among the 100
billion-or-so neurons, the scan would probably also have to register some
of the functional properties of each of the synaptic interconnections, such
as the efficacy of the connection and how stable it is over time (e.g.
whether it is short-term or long-term potentiated). Non-local modulators
such as neurotransmitter concentrations and hormone balances may also need
to be represented, although such parameters likely contain much less data
than the neuronal network itself.

In addition to a good three-dimensional map of a brain, uploading will
require progress in neuroscience to develop functional models of each
species of neuron (how they map input stimuli to outgoing action
potentials, and how their properties change in response to activity in
learning). It will also require a powerful computer to run the upload, and
some way for the upload to interact with the external world or with a
virtual reality. (Providing I/O or a virtual reality for the upload appears
easy in comparison to the other challenges.)

An alternative hypothetical uploading method would proceed more gradually:
One neuron could be replaced by an implant or by a simulation in a computer
outside of the body. Then another neuron, and so on, until eventually the
whole cortex has been replaced and the person’s thinking is implemented on
entirely artificial hardware.

A distinction is sometimes made between destructive uploading, in which the
original brain is destroyed in the process, and non-destructive uploading,
in which the original brain is preserved intact alongside the uploaded
copy. It is a matter of debate under what conditions personal identity
would be preserved in destructive uploading. Many philosophers who have
studied the problem think that at least under some conditions, an upload of
your brain would be you. A widely accepted position is that you survive so
long as certain information patterns are conserved, such as your memories,
values, attitudes and emotional dispositions, and so long as there is
causal continuity so that earlier stages of yourself help determine later
stages of yourself. Views differ on the relative importance of these two
criteria, but they can both be satisfied in the case of uploading. For the
continuation of personhood, it matters much less whether you are
implemented on a silicon chip inside a computer or in that gray, cheesy
lump inside your skull, assuming both implementations are conscious.

Tricky cases arise, however, if we imagine that several similar copies are
made of your uploaded mind. Then which one of them is you? Are they all
you, or is neither of them you? Who owns your property? Who is married to
your spouse? Philosophical, legal, and ethical challenges abound. Maybe
these will be hotly debated political issues later in this century.

A common misunderstanding about uploads is that they would necessarily be
“disembodied” and that this would mean that their experiences would be
impoverished. Uploading according to this view would be the ultimate
escapism, one that only neurotic body-loathers could possibly be attracted
to. But consider that an upload’s experience could in principle be
identical that of a biological human. An upload could have a virtual
(simulated) body giving the same sensations and the same possibilities for
interaction as a non-simulated body. With advanced virtual reality, uploads
could enjoy food, and upload sex could be as messy as you please. And
uploads wouldn’t have to be confined to virtual reality: they could
interact with the people on the outside and even rent robot bodies in order
to work or explore physical reality.

Personal inclinations regarding uploading differ. Many transhumanists have
a pragmatic attitude: whether they would like to upload or not depends on
the precise conditions in which they would live as uploads and what the
alternatives are. The advantages of being an upload include:
· Uploads would not be subject to biological aging.

· Back-up copies of uploads could be created regularly so that you
could be re-booted if something bad happened. (Thus your lifespan would
potentially be as long as the universes’.)

· You could potentially live much cheaper as an upload since you
don’t need physical food, housing, or transportation etc.

· If you were running on a fast computer you would think faster than
in a biological implementation. For instance, if you are running on a
computer a thousand times more powerful than a human brain, then you would
think a thousand times faster (and the external world would appear to you
as if it were slowed down by a factor of a thousand). You would thus get to
experience more subjective time, live more, during any given day.

· You could travel at the speed of light as an information pattern,
which could be convenient in a future age of large-scale space-colonization.

· Radical cognitive enhancements would likely be easier to implement
in an upload than in an organic brain.

A couple of other points about uploading:
· Uploading should work for cryonics patients provided their brains
are preserved in a sufficiently intact state.

· Uploads could reproduce extremely quickly (simply by making copies
of themselves). This implies that resources could very quickly become
scarce unless reproduction is regulated.

Nick Bostrom
Department of Philosophy, Yale University
New Haven, CT 06520 | Phone: (203) 500-0021 | Fax: (203) 432-7950
Homepage: http://www.nickbostrom.com
Received on Wed Oct 16 20:57:28 2002