On Tue, 15 Oct 2002 Nick Bostrom <nick@nickbostrom.com> wrote:
> ...
> For the continuation of personhood, it matters much less whether you are
> implemented on a silicone chip inside a computer or in that gray, cheesy
> lump inside your skull, assuming both implementations are conscious.
> ...
"Silicon chip", no 'e' ;-)
> ...
> A common misunderstanding about uploads is that they would necessarily be
> “disembodied” and that this would mean that their experiences would be
> impoverished. Uploading according to this view would be the ultimate
> escapism, one that only neurotic body-loathers could possibly be attracted
> to. But consider that an upload’s experience could in principle be
> identical that of a biological human. An upload could have a virtual
> (simulated) body giving the same sensations and the same possibilities for
> interaction as a non-simulated body. With advanced virtual reality, uploads
> could enjoy food, and upload sex could be as messy as you please. And
> uploads wouldn’t have to be confined to virtual reality: they could
> interact with the people on the outside and even rent robot bodies in order
> to work or explore physical reality.
You might also want to include something on the possibility of not just
impoverished experiences or identical experiences, but also enriched or
completely new experiences.
-- Aumentar! Onward, Ziana Astralos - ziana@extrotech.net - http://www.extrotech.net/ GCS/MC/IT/L/O d- s-:- a? C++++ W+++ K++ UL w+ M-- PS+++ PE Y+ DI++++Received on Wed Oct 16 18:13:33 2002
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